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EXPEDITING REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
CHARGES THROUGH REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATION
JANICE R. BELLACE* and BERNARD L. SAMOFF**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1979, the National Labor Relations Board once again
experienced an increase in the number of unfair labor practice
charges filed. With the annual announcement of an increase in
unfair labor practice charges having become routine, the cumulative impact of the increases seems to have escaped general notice. During the decade just ended, the number of unfair labor practice charges filed with the NLRB nearly
doubled, from 21,038 in 1970" to 41,259 in 1979.1
Unless the unexpected occurs, the NLRB's caseload should
continue to grow at the same pace during the 1980s, but it is
highly unlikely that the NLRB will be able to add staff in sufficient numbers to cope with such an increased case intake.
Economic constraints on the federal budget dictate little or no
real growth in the NLRB's operating budget in the 1980s. In
addition, both political parties advocate less federal regulation
of business. Such a political climate is not hospitable to increasing the staff of the NLRB which has had no additional
statutory responsibilities since 1974.
Unless the NLRB takes action to halt the increase in its
case intake, it may find that its present staff is incapable of
satisfactorily discharging its statutory responsibilities. In the
hearings on the Labor Reform Bill s in 1978, supporters
* Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1971; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1974; M.Sc.,
London School of Economics, 1975. Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
** Adjunct Professor and Associate Chairman, Department of Management, The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; B.S.Ed., Temple University, 1935;
Ed.M., Temple University, 1937; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1961; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1963.
1. 35 NLRB ANN. REP. 154, table 1 (1970). NLRB annual reports cover the fiscal
year which ends September 30.
2. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 265, table 1 (1979).
3. S. 1883, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This bill died in the Senate after its supporters failed to invoke cloture.
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charged that ineffective remedies and delays in resolving cases
were thwarting the fundamental purposes of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 The delays occurring in the NLRB's
routine processing of section 8(a)(5) charges 5 were seen as particularly destructive to the Act's purposes. Critics of the
Board asserted that a bargaining order issued to an employer
one or two years after an election was a hollow remedy since
the union was hardly in a position to bargain effectively after
such a delay reduced its support among the workers.
In 1979, section 8(a)(5) charges represented 31.6 percent of
all unfair labor practice charges against employers.' Since
one-third of 29,026 charges7 constitutes a substantial number
and since the AFL-CIO is publicizing vigorous new organizing
campaigns, the number of such section 8(a)(5) charges will
most likely increase. This article addresses the problem created by this situation and suggests a systematic framework for
dealing with this problem. This proposal is compatible with
the NLRB's statutory responsibilities and consistent with the
collective bargaining practices endorsed by the NLRB and the
courts. The proposal is simple and builds upon current operating procedures. It requires no statutory changes but merely
calls for minor changes in NLRB rules and regulations. It is
based upon the premise that the NLRB can and should show
the determination, innovation and administrative skills necessary to meet the problem.
Initially, a classification scheme is needed for section
8(a)(5) charges based upon the particular fact pattern in each
case, preliminary to deferral to contractual grievance/arbitration procedures or expanded regional decisionmaking. Each
feature of the overall proposal is tightly connected to every
other element, and the entire scheme constitutes an interrelated system. This proposal can be easily implemented and its

4. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended by 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 83 Stat. 133 (1969), 87
Stat. 314 (1973), 88 Stat. 396 (1974); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as LMRA].
5. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1970)). Section 8(a)(5) of the statute states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." [Hereinafter cited as 8(a)(5)].
6. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 268, table 2 (1979).
7. Id.
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implementation will further public policy. Based on the continued criticism of the current system by participating parties,
the proposal will likely be accepted by the bar, employers and
unions. Furthermore, this proposal would merit implementation on a trial basis if only for the reason that there is a notable dearth of suggestions for meeting the serious problem
addressed.
II.

CLASSIFYING SECTION

8(a)(5)

CASES

The first step in the more efficient processing of cases
arising under section 8(a)(5) begins at the case intake stage.
At that point, cases must be placed on the track that will provide the most appropriate case handling in order to save time.
This can only be achieved by implementing a classification
system at the case intake point. In light of the recurring fact
patterns in 8(a)(5) cases, two classifications should be established: pre-contract and post-contract. In this system, 8(a)(5)
cases in which the union and employer have yet to conclude a
collective agreement would be targeted for more immediate
treatment than those cases which involve an established collective bargaining relationship.
This distinction between pre-contract and post-contract
cases reflects the priorities underlying the LMRA that "the
making of voluntary labor agreements is encouraged by protecting employees' rights to organize for collective bargaining
and by imposing on labor and management the mutual obligation to bargain collectively."" Designed to protect the rights of
employees to select representatives of their own choosing who
will bargain with the employer on their behalf, the LMRA's
principal concern is getting the parties to the bargaining table
so that they can make their own agreement rather than having government dictate the substance of that agreement. Although such a narrow view of the statute's purpose has been
challenged," section 8(d) reinforces this narrow view.
8. NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
9. See, e.g., P. Ross, THE GovERNMEw As A Souacs OF UNION POWER (1965). Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1970)). Section 8(d) of the statute reads in part:
"[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
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Section 8(a)(5) pre-contract cases arising in a post-organizational bargaining situation present a formidable challenge
to the NLRB's administration of the Act. Effective enforcement of the employees' rights at this particular point is crucial because failure to remedy the 8(a)(5) violation in a precontract situation may result in a failure to conclude a contract. Deliberate agency consideration of such cases results in
delay which can be fatal to the union's chances of ever concluding an agreement. For this reason, pre-contract 8(a)(5)
cases demand accelerated case handling which can best be
achieved by devolving the initial responsibility for attempting
to settle the charges to the Regional Director, the authority
closest to the situation.
Since Congress did not intend for the government to regulate the content of collective agreements,1 0 once a union and
an employer have signed a collective agreement, the NLRB
should not intervene to resolve differences that arise in a postcontract dispute. Intervention is warranted only in procedural
areas,1" for instance, when an employer's unilateral change is
alleged to be on a mandatory subject of bargaining, thus violating 8(a)(5). In post-contract disputes, the NLRB should be
sensitive to the availability of private dispute resolution
mechanisms by which the parties have voluntarily agreed to
abide. Not only is this approach in keeping with the spirit of
the Act, which encourages private, voluntary agreements, but
it also results in diversion of potential NLRB cases into private channels freeing the agency's resources for other cases.
This twofold classification of section 8(a)(5) cases includes
both inter-contract and intra-contract disputes in one category of post-contract disputes. As discussed below, post-contract dispute cases should be deferred to arbitration when
possible. Inter-contract disputes, those which arise during negotiations about a new contract to succeed one which has terminated, will not normally be suitable for arbitration.

and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. ..."
10. See NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1952).
11. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 104 (1970).
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Inter-contract disputes may be bitterly contested, particularly those which involve a change in the relative bargaining
power of the parties based on the structure and scope of the
bargaining arrangement. Issues which typically arise in such
inter-contract dispute cases are: the employer's right to close
a plant, the employer's right to sub-contract work, the validity
of successor and assigns provisions, the union's claim that new
enterprises should be brought into the bargaining unit, the
employer's demand for a single employer versus multiemployer unit, the demands for performance bonds and interest
arbitration. In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner
Corp.,12 the Supreme Court scrutinized bargaining subjects
and identified three distinct types: mandatory, permissive and
illegal. The immediate, practical consequences of a bargaining
demand being slotted in a given category are of extreme importance. 13 For example, labeling a subject of bargaining
mandatory rather than permissive is crucially important because it places that subject matter firmly within the realm of
joint regulation by the parties. Since determinations of this
sort go to the very heart of the Act, they are peculiarly within
the province of the NLRB. As such, neither of the previous
proposals (deferral to arbitration nor accelerated case handling) is suitable for processing inter-contract disputes.
In some inter-contract disputes, one party may file an
8(a)(5) charge as a tactical maneuver in bargaining. Such
charges are frequently not taken seriously by either party and
are usually dropped once agreement is reached on a new contract. Since delay in such cases does not imperil the existence
of the collective bargaining relationship, and in fact may actually aid the bargaining process, the present methods of
processing cases should continue to operate in inter-contract
disputes.
III. ARBrrRATION AND THE NLRB
In considering how the NLRB can reduce its caseload, one
underused mechanism with obvious potential is deferral to arbitration. To improve its efficiency in handling section 8(a)(5)
12. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
13. Some examples include whether a party may insist on a bargaining proposal to
impasse, and whether an employer may make a unilateral change.
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cases, the NLRB should defer to arbitration in those disputes
that arise during the life of a contract when there is no allegation of an independent section 8(a)(1) violation. Continuing
adherence to such a policy has the beneficial effect of encouraging employers and unions to resolve contractual differences
through the use of a private, voluntary and universally accepted arrangement. In addition, it would have the positive
consequence of placing more discretionary responsibility upon
the regional offices which are better equipped, at an earlier
stage, to determine whether the facts of a particular case do
14
not satisfy the requirements of Spielberg ManufacturingCo.

or Collyer Insulated Wire.15
Since 1955, when the NLRB decided Spielberg, there has
been a trend to defer unfair labor practice cases to arbitration. In Spielberg, the Board held that it would defer to the
award of an arbitrator where the arbitration proceedings appeared to have been fair and regular, where all parties had
agreed to be bound by the award, and where the arbitrator's
award was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act.1" The policy of deferring to arbitration took a significant leap forward in 1971 with the decision in Collyer.
This case involved an employer's unilateral change made during the life of a contract, allegedly violating both the contract
and section 8(a)(5). In Collyer, the Board held that where the
contract clearly provides for grievance and arbitration machinery, where no evidence exists that the employer is seeking
to undermine the union, where the employer is willing to arbitrate, and where the dispute is well suited to resolution by
arbitration, then the Board would defer to arbitration.
Collyer, however, never found acceptance among all members of the Board, and it is not surprising that the changing
composition of the Board has resulted in a slight shift in the
policy of deferring to arbitration. In 1977, in General American Transportation Corp.,18 the Board held, three-to-two,
14. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
15. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
16. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
17. The 1971 decision was three to two with Member (now Chairman) Fanning
and Member Jenkins dissenting.
18. 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1977). Cases involving alleged violations
of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2) would not be deferred.
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that it would no longer defer cases to arbitration involving alleged violations of individual employee rights. At the same
time, however, a bare majority of the Board held in Roy
Robinson Chevrolet, Inc.19 that contract dispute cases, raising
issues under section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3), would still be referred
to resolution under that contract's arbitration machinery.
Since deferral to arbitration under Collyer was a self-imposed policy not mandated by the LMRA, the Board's decision to change its stance and not to defer in certain categories
of cases was clearly within the area of discretion accorded the
Board by the Act. The demise of deferral to arbitration in individual employee rights cases as dictated by General American Transportationhas been sharply criticized by labor relations practitioners. 20 Additionally, the courts of appeals have
been less than enthusiastic about some of the NLRB's pronouncements on points of substantive law which have been
made in individual employee rights cases.2
With Collyer cut back so severely, there is a question
whether Spielberg will remain unscathed. Although Spielberg
may have continuing validity, it is becoming evident that the
Board will not defer unless the criteria for deferring to the
arbitrator's award have been fully met. In particular, the requirement that the arbitrator's decision not be clearly repugnant to the purposes of the Act is being interpreted to mean
that the arbitrator must have made all findings of fact relevant to the unfair labor practice issue and that the arbitrator
must have applied Board law in making his award.22 The
Board's backsliding on Spielberg has met with judicial disap19. 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977).

20. See, e.g., the remarks of Edward B. Miller, former chairman of the NLRB
before the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association,
ABA Annual Meeting, August 5, 1980. Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Labor Report, No. 156, p.p. D1-4, August 11, 1980.
21. See, e.g., Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1979); Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3233 (Oct. 7, 1980). In both cases, the courts of appeals rejected the Board's view that union officers and stewards do not have a special
duty to prevent wildcat strikes and to take action to end them.
22. See, e.g., Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 175, 105 L.R.R.M. 1519 (1980);
Sea-Land Service, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 147, 100 L.R.R.M. 1406 (1979); Pincus Bros.,
Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 159, 99 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1978); supp. decision, 241 N.L.R.B. 129,
100 L.R.R.M. 1630 (1979); enforcement denied, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
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proval. In NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc. - Maxwell,2" the
Third Circuit held that the Board had to defer to the arbitrator's award because the court found that the arbitrator's
award was not clearly repugnant to the purposes of the Act.
The court took the firm view that once the Board has articulated a standard, it is an abuse of discretion for the Board to
refuse to adhere to the criteria which it itself had clearly
24
defined.
It is imperative that the Board not retreat from the view it
expressed in Roy Robinson Chevrolet. Although the desire of
some Board members to entertain charges in post-contract
8(a)(5) cases is understandable, such a view if accepted by the
majority would place enormous strain on an already overworked system. The justification for putting such a strain on
the system is difficult to perceive. It is extremely unlikely that
five Board members, inundated by post-contract 8(a)(5) cases,
could provide a speedier, more equitable resolution than an
arbitrator in the overwhelming number of cases. The experience and training of the staff of regional offices should adequately enable them to recognize post-contract 8(a)(5) cases
that should not be deferred to arbitration under Spielberg or
Collyer.
Board member John A. Penello, a former regional director,
is an outspoken supporter of deferral to arbitration, as his
speeches and separate opinions emphasize.25 But the NLRB,
with its changing composition over the years, has never approved the operationally feasible deferral position advocated
in this article. However, contemporary conditions, particularly

23. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 372. Judge Rosenn believed that Spielberg was a discretionary adminis-

trative doctrine and not the law of Board deferral, Id. at 372 n.8, whereas Judge
Garth, concurring, believed the Board was acting pursuant to its delegated rule mak-

ing authority. Judge Gibbons, dissenting, stated that the majority was doing something almost unprecedented, "holding that there are instances where the Board must
decline to hear an unfair labor practice charge made by the General Counsel." Id: at

384.
25. See Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 175, 105 L.R.R.M. 1519 (1980); Babcock
and Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 99, 104 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1980). The senior author has
also supported this view. See Summers & Samoff, The Labor Board Looks at Arbitration, 2 LAB. L.J. 329 (1951); Summers & Samoff, A New Look at the NLRB and
Arbitration, 5 LAB. L.J. 535 (1954); Samoff, Arbitration,Not NLRB Intervention, 18
LAB. L.J. 602 (1967); Samoff, Arbitration and the Labor Board, 92 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 54, No. 5 (1969).
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a heavy caseload, may induce the Board to accord the appropriate weight to arbitration that the Supreme Court indicated
it should be accorded in the Steelworkers trilogy cases.26
IV. EXPANDED REGIONAL DECISION MAKING
Enlarging the regional directors' scope and authority to
handle section 8(a)(5) cases is critical to this proposal for
speeding up their disposition. Assessing the crucial role of regional offices, former NLRB Chairman (and current management lawyer) Edward B. Miller noted: "Most of the decisions
which affect our daily practice are made by the Regional Offices, which, while not perfect by any2 7means, are by and large
prompt, efficient and conscientious.
Mr. Miller's assessment seems acceptable to many management and union lawyers and scholars familiar with NLRB
operations. Regional officers, where all cases are filed, dispose
of about eighty-five percent of all cases. 28 Because of this fact,
any system proposed for accelerating case handling must begin with intake in regional offices.
The aim of expanding regional office power in 8(a)(5) cases
is to maximize the efficient use of the NLRB's present resources. However, it must be done in a manner compatible
with the collective bargaining framework without disturbing
existing structures. Regional disposition" of representation
and section 8(b)(7) cases 0 serve as models. Although the lat26. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
27. Remarks of former NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller at the American Bar
Association's Annual Meeting, supra n.16 at D1.
28. 44 NLRB ANN.REP. 285, table 7 (1979).
29. There are 33 regional offices in the United States and Puerto Rico.
30. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1970)). Section 8(b)(7) of the statute states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agentsto picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept such
labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act.
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ter category requires priority under section 10(1) of the Act,
the Board has the authority to accelerate section 8(a)(5) cases
by developing procedures patterned after those used in the
above-mentioned types of cases.31 Quite clearly, this sort of
administrative innovation is long overdue.
Since May 1961, when the Board implemented section
3(b), a 1959 amendment to the Act, by delegating its section 9
powers to regional directors, approximately eighty-five percent of formal representation decisions have been issued by
the regional directors.32 The reality is that the regions, except
for novel, complex and unusual cases, close almost all representation cases without Board involvement.
There has been virtually no employer, union, congressional, or public criticism of either the process or its results.
The only complaints come from some unions who dislike the
delays stemming from employer appeals to the Board of regional directors' decisions. Indeed, delegation is often praised,
processing time has been reduced, and staff resources have
been used more efficiently. Several of the major elements of
the delegation process can and should be adapted to section
8(a)(5) cases.
Among the elements which can be adapted to section

(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided,
That when such a petition has been fied the Board shall forthwith,
without regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a
showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization,
direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and
shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this
subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other
publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including
consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a
contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is
to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of
his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to
perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b).
31. See § 10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
32. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 285, table 1 (1979).
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8(a)(5), several are prominent in this proposal. The principal
ingredient is the regional director's power to marshal and direct professional resources. Second, his firsthand knowledge,
visible responsibility and decentralized authority facilitate
speedier decision making. Third, regional directors are concerned about promptness and efficient use of staff resources
because they must implement their decisions and live with the
parties' reactions. Fourth, regional directors' authority is enhanced because the NLRB will only grant a request for review
of their decisions "where compelling reasons exist therefor,"
and these are limited.3 3 And fifth, this entire process is incorporated in the region's learning and feedback system so that
the professional staff develops practices, skills, strategies and
relationships contributing to time saving and better use of
staff resources.
The main features of the process for expediting section
8(b)(7) cases are the regional director's broad authority and
the parties' sharply restricted appeal rights. Union picketing
for recognition and strategic avoidance of a NLRB election
are characteristic of these 8(b)(7) cases in which an employer's charge and petition generally provoke the union's
countercharges. These, and perhaps the union's challenge to
the employer's appropriate bargaining unit, are obviously intended to wrest recognition and thwart an election. Faced
with these intertwined cases and required to act expeditiously,
the regional director must proceed promptly, either with or
without a formal hearing in the representation case. The adversely affected party has a sharply reduced appeal period.
For example, in contrast to usual procedures, parties may not
file briefs in a formal hearing without special permission. The
same expedited procedure is followed if the regional director
dismisses the petition; again, special permission is required
for an appeal. Finally, should the charge be dismissed, the
party has only three, instead of ten, days in which to appeal.
Several additional aspects of section 8(b)(7) case handling
minimize delays: cases are well supported with documentary
and testimonial evidence, parties know the evidence must be
submitted immediately, the charging employer has a strong

33. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (1980); Also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.77(b), 102.80(a), 102.81(1)
(1980).
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self-interest for speedy handling, and unions and employers
expect fast action and act accordingly. In all aspects section
8(b)(7) case processing provides useful guides for marshalling
resources and diminishing case-handling time in section
8(a)(5) cases.
Undoubtedly, much time would be saved by giving regional directors more authority and responsibility in 8(a)(5)
cases. The suggested model for these cases is based upon the
procedures developed in processing section 8(b)(7) and related
representation cases. This proposal, then, is not merely a
blueprint to identify some constructive guides and tested criteria. These recommendations have worked efficiently and effectively for many years and deserve adaptation for expediting section 8(a)(5) pre-contract cases.
Other procedures may also prove beneficial. To reduce delay, to improve case handling, and to insure due process to the
parties, a joint conference between parties should be held in a
number of special cases. The joint conference would be conducted by staff members under the careful supervision of the
regional director. However, instead of a field investigation in
every section 8(a)(5) pre-contract case, the regional director
would decide which cases warranted the joint conference procedure. Having targeted a case, the regional director would assign a professional to conduct the conference. The Board
agent would not be bound by rules of evidence, the conference
would be informal, and it would be structured to obtain the.
pertinent facts. There would be no briefs or transcripts, and it
is expected that local union and plant personnel would present the evidence.
This arrangement is patterned after the highly successful
joint conference in representation cases where many consent
election agreements are signed. It is designed to speed handling and to provide unions and management with an opportunity to present evidence of their positions. The Board agent
is a facilitator, familiar with the law and procedures and
skilled in helping parties achieve an acceptable outcome. The
parties know that the agent also has authority to recommend
action, a power conducive to effective case handling.
The regional professional would submit a report, including
a summary of the facts, an analysis, and findings and recommendations through the supervisory chain ending with the re-
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gional director. This report would not be furnished to the parties to avoid exceptions which would require more time
through another review level. This system comports with present practice in which a professional investigates each party's
case and submits an internal final investigation report similar
to the one described above. After the regional director has decided, the parties would be informed orally and then the current practice (withdrawal, dismissal, settlement or complaint)
would be followed. It is emphasized that this procedure would
be experimental, on a selective-case basis. 4
The joint conference substitute for field investigations has
several advantages. First, it is an excellent forum for prompt
disposition of cases. When parties hear adverse and challenging evidence, they must re-examine their own positions. Cases
that lack merit would be withdrawn more promptly, and meritorious ones would be sQttled more quickly. Second, investigation of cases would be accelerated because the regional director would schedule the time, date and place of the conference.
Instead of a situation in which the Board agent has to spend
time to locate and interview witnesses, to reinterview witnesses because contrasting and missing evidence is developed,
and to accomodate his schedule to the available time of the
charging party and respondent and their lawyers, all relevant
witnesses and documents would be available at the conference. Third, trivial and tactical cases, and those outside the
ambit of the Act, would be disposed of promptly. Fourth,
knowing this procedure might be used, parties would be less
likely to file strategic, blocking charges or unsupported cases.
Fifth, professional time and energies would be more efficiently
allocated and would be more productively used.
There are, of course, several shortcomings. First, charging
parties would have a much heavier burden. Since most refusal-to-bargain charges are filed by unions against employers,
the former would have to present legally sustainable cases, 35
just as most employers do in priority cases. With this heavier
burden, a question arises as to what extent, if any, agency re34. A somewhat similar program adopted for expedited arbitration is being used
by the United Steelworkers of America and some steel companies. See Fischer, Arbitration: The Steel Industry Experience, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 7, No. 11 (1972).
35. Samoff, NLRB Priority and Injunctions for Discriminatory Discharges, 31
LAB. L.J. 54 (1980).
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sources should be used to assist complaining unions in supporting their charges. Although it may be argued that the proposed requirement upon unions fundamentally changes the
NLRB's responsibility to protect statutory rights, the current
environment, within both the agency and the industrial relations community, supports such innovation. Forty-five years
after the enactment of the Wagner Act,36 unions surely have
the professional competence and resources to sustain this burden of proof.
The second possible shortcoming of this joint conference
procedure would be that each party would know with substantial specificity the other party's evidence. This, however, is the
trend throughout our judicial system where responsive and
detailed pleadings, depositions and interrogatories are encouraged, if not required. Proceedings of a judicial nature
should not be a game between hunter and hunted. However,
an informal, evidence-revealing conference may impair the
general counsel's, management's, or union's case should a formal hearing be held.
Two other potential problems cause concern. Respondents
and charging unions could exploit the joint conference without forthrightly presenting evidence and arguments or attempting to settle. To prevent these problems, the NLRB professional would have to structure and conduct the conference
in such a manner as to minimize the effectiveness of such potential strategies. Finally, the joint conference could end up as
no more than an additional stage in the process without any
savings in time or professional energies.
Although the joint conference should be tried in selected
cases within regions, and experimentally targeted for certain
regions, problems will arise. This is part of a broader system
of proposed changes intended to cope with urgent administrative problems. Feasible and constructive, it helps regional directors stay close to the cases and provides them with authority and discretion for improving case handling. Since the
regional directors will be familiar with the selected cases, will
be able to allocate resources to their processing, and will be
accountable for the results, the regional director can react
36. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING THEMES

A serious challenge facing the NLRB which is troubling
both to employers and unions is a yearly rising caseload that
shows no sign of abatement. Perhaps the more imposing challenge confronting the NLRB is the urgent need to take action
to reduce delays. NLRB structures and procedures badly need
revision and updating. Relief for these problems cannot be
found by adding more staff or amending the statute. Mounting pressure exists for less government intervention, deregulation, and decentralized administration.
As one part of a larger system for coping with a mounting
caseload and slow processing, an unvarying NLRB rule of
deferral to arbitration should be adopted where there is no
evidence of any independent employer interference with, or
restraint or coercion of, employee rights. Although the NLRB
currently defers, changing Board majorities and various exceptions render the present policy less than satisfactory. Such
a rule would save professional time, give more discretion to
regional directors, encourage unions and employers to resolve
their own contractual differences through arbitration - their
agreed-upon process - and would be consistent with the legal
and operational features of collective bargaining. After more
than four decades, the NLRB should have a clear and administratively workable rule.
Another part of the proposal is the establishment of two
categories of section 8(a)(5) cases, pre-contract and post-contract. The union's inability to negotiate the first agreement
because of the employer's allegedly unlawful refusal to bargain is the critical factor delineating the boundaries of the
first category. In this stage the NLRB should marshal its resources to act promptly. Public policy demands that employers unlawfully resisting bargaining should not be allowed to
use dilatory tactics. Unions are impaired in their ability to
strike for a contract. Workers are not sufficiently cohesive, internal organization is weak, strike funds have not yet been
built up, and fighting a war against the employer, a new and
untried experience, has great potential for backfiring at this
stage. In the post-organizational bargaining phase, the em-
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ployer's section 8(a)(5) violation can be, and frequently is,
successful.
The key during the pre-contract stage is prompt handling.
The longer it takes to negotiate the first contract, the weaker
the union becomes. By categorizing section 8(a)(5) cases, the
regional director would either obtain a settlement or proceed
to formal complaint. Singling out such cases for speedy
processing is consistent with the statute's purposes and
should improve the administration of the NLRB.
Transferring more decision making to the regions is an integral feature of such a proposal. In both representation and
priority cases, regional handling has been most effective in allocating regional professional resources to reduce delays.
Mindful of the differences between section 8(a)(5) cases on
the one hand, and those noted above on the other, sufficient
similarities exist to apply the case-processing techniques of
the latter to the former. Although the law mandates priority
handling for certain types of cases, it does not preclude the
NLRB from adapting these procedures to section 8(a)(5) precontract cases.
Also, use of the joint conference technique in selected
cases is another recommendation designed to save time. These
would be conducted by a professional without a transcript,
briefs or formal rules of evidence and would replace time-consuming field investigations. Relying upon the Board agent's
report, the regional director would decide, the parties would
be advised orally, and then current practice would be followed. While such a procedure offers both advantages and
shortcomings, the former outweigh the latter to allow experimental implementation on an optional basis.
In an average year, about sixty-six percent of all unfair labor practice charges are withdrawn or dismissed, twenty-eight
37
percent are adjusted and only six percent are litigated.
These figures alone demonstrate that regional offices play the
key role in case disposition. Unstated and unacknowledged is
the assumption that regional directors and regional staffs are
fully capable of exercising additional authority with restraint
and sensitivity. Realism and experience suggest that this is
not absolutely true for every regional office. Since regional of37. 44 NLRB

ANN.

RzP. 5, chart 3 (1979).
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fices have competently handled representation and priority
cases, each one is presumptively qualified to undertake the
new tasks. If the proposal were implemented and a particular
regional office was not adequately handling the changed procedures, the general counsel should be able to correct
whatever inadequacies are revealed.
The continuing themes undergirding this proposal are efficiency, better service delivery, fewer redundant actions, faster
solutions and concentration of resources on feasible tasks. Efficiency, however admirable and important, is not the only or
even the highest value in our government. Other factors to be
considered are a growing case load, a hiring freeze, less government intervention, budgetary restraints, tactical charges
and demands for better public goods.
Review of NLRB and court decisions during the past few
years reveals fairly settled substantive law. Neither significantly new legal principles nor innovative breakthroughs in
remedies have emerged. The Board and the courts have been
fleshing out some statutory lacunae. In this context the
NLRB's major task lies in administration, which has been neglected, if not ignored. Circumstances press strongly for better
delivery of NLRB services.
While people familiar with the NLRB concur with this
conclusion, few express their views publicly. An exception is
former NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller who observed that
NLRB procedures and structures "badly need modernization
and updating or they will soon break down. '3 In the same
speech, he said that the Board's operating machinery is "too
cumbersome, too slow, too awkward and too inadequate to
deal with today's caseload."3 9 Although there have been many
critics of the agency, there have been virtually no reformers in
a position to take corrective action. As Derek Bok once noted,
in our "decentralized, adversary system of labor relations,
there are no union and management organizations with authority or will to join together to improve the quality of legis-

38. Address by Edward B. Miller before the Hawaii Employers Council, Honolulu,
Hawaii (November 16, 1972). See also Miller's address before the Central Illinois Industrial Association, Peoria, Illinois (February 1, 1973), which contained similar
themes. Copies of these speeches are on file at the Marquette Law Review.
39. Id. For a fuller exposition of former Chairman Miller's views, see E. MILLER,
AN ADMINISTRATIvE APPRAISAL OF THE

NLRB (1977).
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lation and the administration and staffing of legal institutions. ' 40 In such a situation, only the NLRB can be the
catalyst for change.
The agency's structure and operations have reflected a
continuing shift of authority to the regional directors. While
originally only the NLRB could authorize complaints, most
regional directors now have this authority. Although Washington must control the budget and staffing, coordinate planning,
and furnish direction and leadership, the regional directors
should be accorded an increased measure of decentralized
discretion.
Library shelves are overflowing with diagnoses of what is
wrong, but they are pitifully barren of practical suggestions
for rectifying matters. This article and its recommendations
contain a strong dose of enlightened practicality, eschewing
utopian and nebulous means. Such practicality provides a basis for believing this approach will be accepted by the agency's
clientele. The incremental alterations proposed may not be
welcomed by all, particularly since they challenge embedded
patterns. To decrease resistance to these changes, the NLRB
must be prepared to use publicity, persuasion, exposition and
determination.
The overall aim is to meet the needs of those who use, or
might use, this proposal. The users of first importance are
managers at all levels of the enterprise, union officers and lawyers representing both employers and unions. While this proposal may not be entirely satisfactory or necessarily an enduring solution, even an incremental move in the direction of
improved output, better service delivery, faster disposition,
justice in the workplace, and marshalling of resources is to the
good. Others may analyze, support, criticize or suggest a substitute for this proposal. Whatever specific position is espoused, it must be borne in mind that the situation at present
urgently demands that something be done now to meet the
goals mentioned above.

40. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1394, 1448 (1971).

